Curricular information is subject to change.
Upon completion of this module students should:
-be able to recognize distinct forms of asymmetry of information.
-be familiar with the implications the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection have on optimal contracts designed by principals.
-be able to derive optimat contracts formally using theoretical models that describe the relationship with agents and principals under both moral hazard and adverse selection.
| Student Effort Type | Hours |
|---|---|
| Lectures | 22 |
| Tutorial | 8 |
| Autonomous Student Learning | 72 |
| Total | 102 |
Not applicable to this module.
| Description | Timing | Component Scale | % of Final Grade | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exam (In-person): Final exam including multiple choice questions and problems to solve analytically. | End of trimester Duration: 2 hr(s) |
Alternative linear conversion grade scale 40% | No | 60 |
No |
| Exam (In-person): Midterm exam that includes multiple choice questions and problems to solve analytically. | End of trimester Duration: 2 hr(s) |
Alternative linear conversion grade scale 40% | No | 40 |
No |
| Remediation Type | Remediation Timing |
|---|---|
| In-Module Resit | Prior to relevant Programme Exam Board |
• Group/class feedback, post-assessment
Solutions to midterm and homework assignments will be discussed in class.